The Fear of the Lord, the Way That Seems Right, and Wisdom for Household, Speech, and Community

Pro 14:6 6 In vain the scorner seeketh wisdom; But to the man of understanding knowledge is easy. The general sentence is concrete, composed in the common historical form. Regarding ואין, necquidquam , vid . , at Pro 13:4. The participle נקל is here neut. for נקלּה, something which makes itself easy or light. The frivolous man, to whom truth is not a matter of conscience, and who recognises no authority, not even the Supreme, never reaches to truth notwithstanding all his searching, it remains veiled to him and far remote; but to the man of understanding, who knows that the fear of God and not estrangement from God leads to truth, knowledge is an easy matter - he enters on the right way to this end, he brings the right receptivity, brings to bear on it the clear eye, and there is fulfilled to him the saying, “To him that hath it is given.

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Pro 14:7 Three proverbs regarding fools: 7 Go from the presence of a foolish man, And surely thou hast not known lips of knowledge; i. e. , surely hast not brought into experience that he possesses lips which express experimental knowledge, or: surely thou must confess on reflection that no prudent word has come forth from his mouth. If 7b were intended to assign a motive, then the expression would be כּי בל־תּדע or וּבל־תּדע (Isa 44:9), according to which Aquila and Theodotion translate, καὶ οὐ μὴ γνῷς.

נגד is the sphere of vision, and מנּגד denotes either away from the sphere of vision, as e. g. , Isa 1:16, or, inasmuch as מן is used as in מעל, מתּחת, and the like: at a certain distance from the sphere of vision, but so that one keeps the object in sight, Gen 21:16. נגד ל denotes, as the inverted expression Deu 28:66 shows, over against any one, so that he has the object visibly before him, and מנּגד ל, Jdg 20:34, from the neighbourhood of a place where one has it in view.

So also here: go away from the vis-à-vis ( vis = visûs) of the foolish man, if thou hast to do with such an one; whence, 7b, follows what he who has gone away must on looking back say to himself. בל (with the pret. as e. g. , Isa 33:23) expresses a negative with emphasis. Nolde and others, also Fleischer, interpret 7b relatively: et in quo non cognoveris labia scientiae .

If וּבל־ידע were the expression used, then it would be explained after Pro 9:13, for the idea of the foolish man is extended: and of such an one as absolutely knows not how to speak anything prudent. But in וּבל־ידעתּ the relative clause intended must be indicated by the added בּו: and of such an one in whom... Besides, in this case וּלא ( vid . , Psa 35:15) would have been nearer than וּבל.

The lxx has modified this proverb, and yet has brought out nothing that is correct; not only the Syr. , but also Hitzig follows it, when he translates, “The foolish man hath everything before him, but lips of knowledge are a receptacle of knowledge” (וּכלי דּעת). It racks one’s brains to find out the meaning of the first part here, and, as Böttcher rightly says, who can be satisfied with the “lips of knowledge” as the “receptacle of knowledge”?

Pro 14:8 8 The wisdom of the prudent is to observe his way, And the folly of fools is deceit. The nearest idea is that of self-deceit, according to which the lxx, Syr. , and Jerome render the word error (“ Irrsal ”). But מרמה is nowhere else used of self-deception, and moreover is not the suitable word for such an idea, since the conception of the dolus malus is constantly associated with it.

Thus the contrast will be this: the wisdom of the prudent shows itself in this, that he considers his conduct (הבין as Pro 7:7, cf. Psa 5:2), i. e. , regulates it carefully, examining and considering (Pro 13:16) it according to right and duty; and that on the contrary the folly of fools shows itself in this, that they aim at the malevolent deception of their neighbour, and try all kinds of secret ways for the gaining of this end.

The former is wisdom, because from the good only good comes; the latter is folly or madness, because deception, however long it may sneak in darkness, yet at last comes to light, and recoils in its destructive effects upon him from whom it proceeds.

Pro 14:9 9 The sacrificial offering of fools mocketh; But between upright men there is good understanding We may not give to the Hiph . הליץ any meaning which it nowhere has, as, to excuse (Kimchi), or to come to an agreement by mediation (Schultens). So we may not make אוילים the subject (Targ. , Symmachus, Jerome, Luther, “fools make sport with sin”), for one is persuaded that אוילים is equivalent to כל אחר מן האוילים (Immanuel, Meîri, and others), which would be more admissible if we had מליץ ( vid .

, Pro 3:35), or if יליץ did not immediately follow ( vid . , Pro 28:1). Aquila and Theodotion rightly interpret the relation of the component parts of the sentence: ἄφρονας χλευάζει πλημμέλια; and this translation of אשׁם also is correct is we take πλημμέλεια in the sense of a θυσία περὶ πλημμελείας (Sir. 7:31), in which the Judaeo-Hellenic actually uses it ( vid .

, Schleusner’s Lex .) The idea of sacrificial offering is that of expiation: it is a penitential work, it falls under the prevailing point of view of an ecclesiastical punishment, a satisfactio in a church-disciplinary sense; the forgiveness of sins is conditioned by this, (1) that the sinner either abundantly makes good by restitution the injury inflicted on another, or in some other way bears temporal punishment for it, and (2) that he willingly presents the sacrifices of rams or of sheep, the value of which the priest has to determine in its relation to the offence (by a tax-scale from 2 shekels upwards).

The Torâ gives accurately the offences which are thus to be atoned for. Here, with reference to 9b, there particularly comes into view the offence against property (Lev. 5:20ff.) and against female honour (Lev 19:20-22). Fools fall from one offence into another, which they have to atone for by the presentation of sacrificial offerings; the sacrificial offering mocketh them (הליץ with accus.

-object , as Pro 19:28; Psa 119:51), for it equally derides them on account of the self-inflicted loss, and on account of the efforts with which they must make good the effects of their frivolity and madness; while on the contrary, among men of upright character, רצון, a relation of mutual favour, prevails, which does not permit that the one give to the other an indemnity, and apply the Asham - [אשׁם = trespass-offering] Torâ . Symmachus rightly: καὶ ἀνάμεσον εὐθέων εὐδοκία.

But the lxx confuses this proverb also. Hitzig, with the Syr. , follows it and translates: The tents of the foolish are in punishment overthrown [ verfällt ]; The house of the upright is well-pleasing [ wolgefällt ]. Is not this extravagant [ ungereimt = not rhymed] in spite of the rhyme? These אהלי [tents] extracted from אוילים, and this בית [house] formed out of בין, are nothing but an aimless and tasteless flourish.

Pro 14:10 Four proverbs of joy and sorrow in the present and the future: 10 The heart knoweth the trouble of its soul, And no stranger can intermeddle with its joy. The accentuation לב יודע seems to point out יודע as an adjective (Löwenstein: a feeling heart), after 1Ki 3:9, or genit. (of a feeling heart); but Cod. 1294 and the Jemen Cod. , and others, as well as the editions of Jablonsky and Michaelis, have לב with Rebia , so that this is by itself to be taken as the subject (cf.

the accentuation Pro 15:5 and under at 16a). מרּת has the ר with Dagesh , and consequently the short Kametz ( Michlol 63b), like שׁרּך Pro 3:8, cf. כּרתה, Jdg 6:28, and on the contrary כרּת, Eze 16:4; it is the fem. of mōr = morr, from מרר, adstringere, amarum esse . Regarding לב, in contradistinction to נפשׁ, vid . , Psychol . p. 251. “All that is meant by the Hellenic and Hellenistic νοῦς, λόγος, συνείδησις, θυμός, is comprehended in καρδία, and all by which the בשׂר and נפשׁ are affected comes in לב into the light of consciousness.

” The first half of the proverb is clear: the heart, and only it, i. e. , the man in the centre of his individuality, knows what brings bitterness to his soul, i. e. , what troubles him in the sphere of his natural life and of the nearest life-circle surrounding him. It thus treats of life experiences which are of too complex a nature to be capable of being fully represented to others, and, as we are wont to say, of so delicate a nature that we shrink from uncovering them and making them known to others, and which on this account must be kept shut up in our own hearts, because no man is so near to us, or has so fully gained our confidence, that we have the desire and the courage to pour out our hearts to him from their very depths.

Yet the saying, “Every one knows where the shoe pinches him” (1Ki 8:38), stands nearer to this proverb; here this expression receives a psychological, yet a sharper and a deeper expression, for the knowledge of that which grieves the soul is attributed to the heart, in which, as the innermost of the soul-corporeal life, it reflects itself and becomes the matter-of-fact of the reflex consciousness in which it must shut itself up, but also for the most part without external expression. If we now interpret לא־יתערב as prohibitive, then this would stand (with this exception, that in this case אל instead of לא is to be expected) in opposition, certainly not intended, to the exhortation, Rom 12:15, “Rejoice with them that do rejoice,” and to the saying, “Distributed joy is doubled joy, distributed sorrow is half sorrow;” and an admonition to leave man alone with his joy, instead of urging him to distribute it, does not run parallel with 10a.

Therefore we interpret the fut. as potentialis . As there is a soul-sorrow of the man whose experience is merely a matter of the heart, so there is also a soul-joy with which no other ( vid . , regarding זר, p. 135, and cf. here particularly Job 19:27) intermeddleth (ההערב בּ like Psa 106:35), in which no other can intermeddle, because his experience, as e. g.

, of blessed spiritual affection or of benevolent feeling, is purely of a personal nature, and admits of no participation (cf. on ἔκρυψε, Mat 13:44), and thus of no communication to others. Elster well observes: “By this thought, that the innermost feelings of a man are never fully imparted to another man, never perfectly cover themselves with the feelings of another, yea, cannot at all be fully understood by another, the worth and the significance of each separate human personality is made conspicuous, not one of which is the example of a species, but each has its own peculiarity, which no one of countless individuals possesses.

At the same time the proverb has the significance, that it shows the impossibility of a perfect fellowship among men, because one never wholly understands another. Thereby it is indicated that no human fellowship can give true salvation, but only the fellowship with God, whose love and wisdom are capable of shining through the most secret sanctuary of human personality.

” Thus also Dächsel (but he interprets 10b admonitorily): “Each man is a little world in himself, which God only fully sees through and understands. His sorrow appertaining to his innermost life, and his joy, another is never able fully to transfer to himself. Yea, the most sorrowful of all experiences, the most inward of all joys, we possess altogether alone, without any to participate with us.

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Pro 14:11 11 The house of the wicked is overthrown; But the tent of the upright flourishes. In the cogn. proverb, Pro 12:7, line 2 begins with וּבית, but here the apparently firmly-founded house is assigned to the godless, and on the contrary the tent, easily destroyed, and not set up under the delusion of lasting for ever, is assigned to the righteous. While the former is swept away without leaving a trace behind (Isa 14:23), the latter has blossoms and shoots (הפריח as inwardly transitive, like Job 14:9; Psa 92:14); the household of such remains not only preserved in the same state, but in a prosperous, happy manner it goes forward and upward.

Pro 14:12 12 There is a way that seemeth right to one, But the end thereof are the ways of death. This is literally repeated in Pro 16:25. The rightness is present only as a phantom, for it arises wholly from a terrible self-deception; the man judges falsely and goes astray when, without regard to God and His word, he follows only his own opinions. It is the way of estrangement from God, of fleshly security; the way of vice, in which the blinded thinks to spend his life, to set himself to fulfil his purposes; but the end thereof (אחריתהּ with neut.

fem. : the end of this intention, that in which it issues) are the ways of death. He who thus deceives himself regarding his course of life, sees himself at last arrived at a point from which every way which now further remains to him leads only down to death. The self-delusion of one ends in death by the sentence of the judge, that of another in self-murder; of one in loathsome disease, of another in a slow decay under the agony of conscience, or in sorrow over a henceforth dishonoured and distracted life.

Pro 14:13 13 Even in the midst of laughter the heart experiences sadness; And to it, joy, the end is sorrow. Every human heart carries the feeling of disquiet and of separation from its true home, and of the nothingness, the transitoriness of all that is earthly; and in addition to this, there is many a secret sorrow in every one which grows out of his own corporeal and spiritual life, and from his relation to other men; and this sorrow, which is from infancy onward the lot of the human heart, and which more and more depends and diversifies itself in the course of life, makes itself perceptible even in the midst of laughter, in spite of the mirth and merriment, without being able to be suppressed or expelled from the soul, returning always the more intensely, the more violently we may have for a time kept it under and sunk it in unconsciousness.

Euchel cites here the words of the poet, according to which 13a is literally true: “No, man is not made for joy; Why weep his eyes when in heart he laughs? ” From the fact that sorrow is the fundamental condition of humanity, and forms the background of laughter, it follows, 13b, that in general it is not good for man to give himself up to joy, viz. , sensual (worldly), for to it, joy, the end (the issue) is sorrow.

That is true also of the final end, which according to that saying, μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν ὅτι γελάσετε, changes laughter into weeping, and weeping into laughter. The correction אחרית השּׂמחה (Hitzig) presses upon the Mishle style an article in such cases rejected, and removes a form of expression of the Hebr. syntaxis ornata , which here, as at Isa 17:6, is easily obviated, but which is warranted by a multitude of other examples, vid .

, at Pro 13:4 (also Pro 5:22), and cf. Philippi’s Status Const . p. 14f. , who regards the second word, as here שׂמהה, after the Arab. , as accus. But in cases like שׂנאי שׁקר, although not in cases such as Ezr 2:62, the accus. rendering is tenable, and the Arab. does not at all demand it. In the old Hebr. this solutio of the st. constr . belongs to the elegances of the language; it is the precursor of the vulgar post-bibl.

אחרייהּ שׂל־שׂמחה. That the Hebr. may also retain a gen. where more or fewer parts of a sentence intervene between it and its governing word, is shown by such examples as Isa 48:9; Isa 49:7; Isa 61:7.

Pro 14:14 There follows a series of proverbs which treat of the wicked and the good, and of the relation between the foolish and the wise: 14 He that is of a perverse heart is satisfied with his own ways; And a good man from himself. We first determine the subject conception. סוּג לב (one turning aside τῆς καρδίας or τὴν καρδίαν) is one whose heart is perverted, נסוג, turned away, viz.

, from God, Psa 44:19. The Book of Proverbs contains besides of this verb only the name of dross ( recedanea ) derived from it; סוּג, separated, drawn away, is such a half passive as סוּר, Isa 49:21, שׁוּב, Mic 2:8, etc. (Olsh. §245a). Regarding אישׁ טוב, vid . , at Pro 12:2, cf. Pro 13:22 : a man is so called whose manner of thought and of action has as its impulse and motive self-sacrificing love.

When it is said of the former that he is satisfied with his own ways, viz. , those which with heart turned away from God he enters upon, the meaning is not that they give him peace or bring satisfaction to him (Löwenstein), but we see from Pro 1:31; Pro 18:20, that this is meant recompensatively: he gets, enjoys the reward of his wandering in estrangement from God.

It is now without doubt seen that 14b expresses that wherein the benevolent man finds his reward. We will therefore not explain (after Pro 4:15, cf. Num 16:26; 2Sa 19:10): the good man turns himself away from him, or the good man stands over him (as Jerome, Venet . , after Ecc 5:7); - this rendering gives no contrast, or at least a halting one. The מן of מעליו must be parallel with that of מדּרכיו.

From the lxx, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ, the Syr. rightly: from the fruit (religiousness) of his soul; the Targ. : from his fruit. Buxtorf, against Cappellus, has already perceived that here no other phrase but the explanation of מעליו by ex eo quod penes se est lies at the foundation. We could, after Pro 7:14, also explain: from that which he perceives as his obligation (duty); yet that other explanation lies proportionally nearer, but yet no so that we refer the suffix to the backslider of 14a: in it (his fate) the good man is satisfied, for this contrast also halts, the thought is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs (for Pro 29:16 does not justify it); and in how totally different a connection of thought מעליו is used in the Book of Proverbs, is shown by Pro 24:17; but generally the Scripture does not use שׂבע of such satisfaction, it has, as in 14a, also in 14b, the recompensative sense, according to the fundamental principle, ὃ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει (Gal 6:7).

The suffix refers back to the subject, as we say: רוּחי עלי, נפשׁי עלי ( Psychol . p. 152). But considerations of an opposite kind also suggest themselves. Everywhere else מעל refers not to that which a man has within himself, but that which he carries without; and also that מעליו can be used in the sense of משּׁעליו, no evidence can be adduced: it must be admitted to be possible, since the writer of the Chronicles (2Ch 1:4) ventures to use בהכין.

Is מעליו thus used substantively: by his leaves (Aben Ezra and others)? If one compares Pro 11:28 with Psa 1:3, this explanation is not absurd; but why then did not the poet rather use מפּריו? We come finally to the result, that ומעליו, although it admits a connected interpretation, is an error of transcription. But the correction is not וּמעלּיו (Elster) nor וּמעלליו (Cappellus), for עלּים and עללים, deeds, are words which do not exist; nor is it וּמפּעליו (Bertheau) nor וּמגּמליו (Ewald), but וּממּעלליו (which Cappellus regarded, but erroneously, as the lxx phrase); for (1) throughout almost the whole O.

T. , from Jdg 2:19 to Zec 1:18, דרכים and מעללים are interchangeable words, and indeed almost an inseparable pair, cf. particularly Jer 17:10; and (2) when Isaiah (Isa 3:10) says, אמרו צדיק כי־טוב כּי־פרי מעלליהם יאכלוּ, this almost sounds like a prophetical paraphrase of the second line of the proverb, which besides by this emendation gains a more rhythmical sound and a more suitable compass.

Pro 14:15 15 The simple believeth every word; But the prudent takes heed to his step. We do not translate, “every thing,” for “word” and faith are correlates, Psa 106:24, and פּתי is the non-self-dependent who lets himself be easily persuaded by the talk of another: he believes every word without proving it, whether it is well-meant, whether it is true, whether it is salutary and useful, so that he is thus, without having any firm principle, and without any judgment of his own, driven about hither and thither; the prudent, on the other hand, considers and marks his step, that he may not take a false step or go astray, he proves his way (8a), he takes no step without thought and consideration (בּין or הבין with ל, to consider or reflect upon anything, Psa 73:17, cf.

Psa 33:15) - he makes sure steps with his feet (Heb 12:13), without permitting himself to waver and sway by every wind of doctrine (Eph 4:14).

Pro 14:16 16 The wise feareth and departeth from evil; But the fool loseth his wits and is regardless. Our editions have ירא with Munach , as if חכם ירא were a substantive with its adjective; but Cod. 1294 has חכם with Rebia , and thus it must be: חכם is the subject, and what follows is its complex predicate. Most interpreters translate 16b: the fool is over-confident (Zöckler), or the fool rushes on (Hitzig), as also Luther: but a fool rushes wildly through, i.

e. , in a daring, presumptuous manner. But התעבּר denotes everywhere nothing else than to fall into extreme anger, to become heated beyond measure, Pro 26:17 (cf. Pro 20:2), Deu 3:26, etc. Thus 16a and 16b are fully contrasted. What is said of the wise will be judged after Job 1:1, cf. Psa 34:15; Psa 37:27 : the wise man has fear, viz. , fear of God, or rather, since האלהים is not directly to be supplied, that careful, thoughtful, self-mistrusting reserve which flows from the reverential awe of God; the fool, on the contrary, can neither rule nor bridle his affections, and without any just occasion falls into passionate excitement.

But on the other side he is self-confident, regardless, secure; while the wise man avoids the evil, i. e. , carefully goes out of its way, and in N. T. phraseology “works out his own salvation with fear and trembling. ”

Pro 14:17 This verse, as if explanatory of מתעבר, connects itself with this interpretation of the contrasts, corresponding to the general usus loquendi , and particularly to the Mishle style. One who is quick to anger worketh folly, And a man of intrigues is hated. Ewald finds here no right contrast. He understands אישׁ מזמּה in a good sense, and accordingly corrects the text, substituting for ישׂנא, ישׁוּא (ישׁוּא), for he translates: but the man of consideration bears (properly smooths, viz.

, his soul). On the other hand it is also to be remarked, that אישׁ מזמה, when it occurs, is not to be understood necessarily in a good sense, since מזמה is used just like מזמות, at one time in a good and at another in a bad sense, and that we willingly miss the “most complete sense” thus arising, since the proverb, as it stands in the Masoretic text, is good Hebrew, and needs only to be rightly understood to let nothing be missed in completeness.

The contrast, as Ewald seeks here to represent it (also Hitzig, who proposes ישׁאן: the man of consideration remains quiet; Syr. ramys, circumspect), we have in Pro 14:29, where the μακρόθυμος stands over against the ὀξύθυμος (אף or אפּים of the breathing of anger through the nose, cf. Theocritus, i. 18: καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ δριμεῖα χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται). Here the contrast is different: to the man who is quick to anger, who suddenly gives expression to his anger and displeasure, stands opposed the man of intrigues, who contrives secret vengeance against those with whom he is angry.

Such a deceitful man, who contrives evil with calculating forethought and executes it in cold blood (cf. Psa 37:7), is hated; while on the contrary the noisy lets himself rush forward to inconsiderate, mad actions, but is not hated on that account; but if in his folly he injures or disgraces himself, or is derided, or if he even does injury to the body and the life of another, and afterwards with terror sees the evil done in its true light, then he is an object of compassion.

Theodotion rightly: (ἀνὴρ δὲ) διαβουλιῶν μισηθήσεται, and Jerome: vir versutus odiosus est (not the Venet . ἀνὴρ βδελυγμῶν, for this signification has only זמּה, and that in the sing.) ; on the contrary, the lxx, Syr. , Targum, and Symmachus incorrectly understand איש מזמות in bonam partem .

Pro 14:18 18 The simple have obtained folly as an inheritance; But the prudent put on knowledge as a crown. As a parallel word to נחלוּ, יכתּרוּ (after the Masora defective), also in the sense of Arab. âkthar, multiplicare, abundare (from Arab. kathura, to be much, perhaps properly comprehensive, encompassing), would be appropriate, but it is a word properly Arabic.

On the other hand, inappropriate is the meaning of the Heb. -Aram. כּתּר, to wait (properly waiting to surround, to go round any one, cf. manere aliquem or aliquod ), according to which Aquila, ἀναμενούσιν, and Jerome, expectabunt . Also הכתּיר, to encompass in the sense of to embrace (lxx κρατήσουσιν), does not suffice, since in the relation to נחלו one expects an idea surpassing this.

Certainly there is a heightening of the idea in this, that the Hiph . in contradistinction to נחל would denote an object of desire spontaneously sought for. But far stronger and more pointed is the heightening of the idea when we take יכתרו as the denom. of כּרת (Gr. κίταρις, κίδαρις, Babyl. כדר, cudur, cf. כּדּוּר, a rounding, sphaera ). Thus Theodotion, στεφθήσονται.

The Venet . better actively, ἐστέψαντο (after Kimchi: ישׂימו הדעת ככתר על ראשם), the Targ. , Jerome, Luther (but not the Syr. , which translates נחלו by “to inherit,” but יכתרו by μεριοῦνται, which the lxx has for נחלו). The bibl. language has also (Ps. 142:8) הכתיר in the denom. signification of to place a crown, and that on oneself; the non-bibl. has מכתיר (like the bibl.

מעטיר) in the sense of distributor of crowns, and is fond of the metaphor כתר הדעת, crown of knowledge. With those not self-dependent ( vid . , regarding the plur. form of פּתי, p. 56), who are swayed by the first influence, the issue is, without their willing it, that they become habitual fools: folly is their possession, i. e. , their property. The prudent, on the contrary, as Pro 14:15 designates them, have thoughtfully to ponder their step to gain knowledge as a crown (cf.

העשׁיר, to gain riches, הפריח, 11b, to gain flowers, Gesen. §53, 2). Knowledge is to them not merely an inheritance, but a possession won, and as such remains with them a high and as it were a kingly ornament.

Pro 14:19 19 The wicked must bow before the good, And the godless stand at the doors of the righteous. The good, viz. , that which is truly good, which has love as its principle, always at last holds the supremacy. The good men who manifest love to men which flows from love to God, come finally forward, so that the wicked, who for a long time played the part of lords, bow themselves willingly or unwillingly before them, and often enough it comes about that godless men fall down from their prosperity and their places of honour so low, that they post themselves at the entrance of the stately dwelling of the righteous (Pro 13:22), waiting for his going out and in, or seeking an occasion of presenting to him a supplication, or also as expecting gifts to be bestowed (Psa 37:25).

The poor man Lazarus πρὸς τὸν πυλῶνα of the rich man, Luk 16:20, shows, indeed, that this is not always the case on this side of the grave. שׁחוּ has, according to the Masora (cf. Kimchi’s Wörterbuch under שׁחח), the ultima accented; the accentuation of the form סכּוּ wavers between the ult . and penult . Olsh. p. 482f. , cf. Gesen. 68, Anm . 10. The substantival clause 19b is easily changed into a verbal clause: they come (Syr.)

, appear, stand (incorrectly the Targ. : they are judged in the gates of the righteous).

Pro 14:20 Three proverbs on the hatred of men: 20 The poor is hated even by his neighbour; But of those who love the rich there are many. This is the old history daily repeating itself. Among all people is the saying and the complaint: Donec eris felix multos numerabis amicos , Tempora si fuerint nubilia solus eris . The Book of Proverbs also speaks of this lamentable phenomenon.

It is a part of the dark side of human nature, and one should take notice of it, so that when it goes well with him, he may not regard his many friends as all genuine, and when he becomes poor, he may not be surprised by the dissolution of earlier friendship, but may value so much the higher exceptions to the rule. The connection of the passive with ל of the subject (cf.

Pro 13:13), as in the Greek with the dative, is pure Semitic; sometimes it stands with מן, but in the sense of ἀπό, Sol 3:10, before the influence of the West led to its being used in the sense of ὑπό (Ges. §143, 2); ישּׂנא, is hated (Cod. 1294: ישּׂנא, connects with the hatred which is directed against the poor also the indifference which makes him without sympathy, for one feels himself troubled by him and ashamed.

Pro 14:21 21 Whoever despiseth his neighbour committeth sin; But whoever hath compassion on the suffering - blessings on him! One should regard every human being, especially such as God has placed near to him, as a being having the same origin, as created in the image of God, and of the same lofty destination, and should consider himself as under obligation to love him.

He who despiseth his neighbour (write בּז with Metheg , and vid . , regarding the constr. with dat. object. Pro 6:30, cf. Pro 11:12; Pro 13:13) sins in this respect, that he raises himself proudly and unwarrantably above him; that the honour and love he shows to him he measures not by the rule of duty and of necessity, but according to that which is pleasing to himself; and in that he refuses to him that which according to the ordinance of God he owes him.

In Pro 14:21 the Chethı̂b עניּים and the Kerı̂ ענוים ( vid . , at Psa 9:13) interchange in an inexplicable way; עני is the bowed down (cf. Arab. ma'nuww, particularly of the prisoner, from 'ana, fut. ya'nw, to bow, bend), ענו (Arab. 'anin, with the art. âl'niy, from the intrans. 'aniya, to be bowed down) the patient bearer who in the school of suffering has learned humility and meekness.

One does not see why the Kerı̂ here exchanges that passive idea for this ethical one, especially since, in proving himself to be מחונן (compassionate) (for which elsewhere the part . Kal חונן, Pro 14:31; Pro 19:17; Pro 28:8), one must be determined only by the needy condition of his neighbour, and not by his (the neighbour’s) moral worthiness, the want of which ought to make him twofold more an object of our compassion.

All the old translators, from the lxx to the Venet . and Luther, on this account adopt the Chethı̂b.

Pro 14:22 The proverb terminating (Pro 14:21) with אשׁריו (cf. Pro 16:20) is now followed by one not less singularly formed, commencing with הלא (cf. Pro 8:1). Will they not go astray who devise evil, And are not mercy and truth to those who devise good? The part. חרשׁ signifies both the plougher and the artisan; but on this account to read with Hitzig both times חרשׁי, i.

e. , machinatores , is nothing less than advisable, since there is connected with this metaphorical חרשׁ, as we have shown at Pro 3:29, not only the idea of fabricating, but also that of ploughing. Just so little is there any reason for changing with Hitzig, against all old translators, יתעוּ into ירעוּ: will it not go ill with them... ; the fut. יתעו (cf. Isa 63:17) is not to be touched; the perf.

תעו ( e. g. , Psa 58:4) would denote that those who contrive evil are in the way of error, the fut. on the contrary that they will fall into error (cf. Pro 12:26 with Job 12:24). But if הלא יתעו is the expression of the result which shall certainly come to such, then 22b stands as a contrast adapted thereto: and are not, on the contrary, mercy and truth those who contrive that which is good, i.

e. , (for that which befalls them, as Pro 13:18, cf. Pro 14:35, is made their attribute) are they not an object of mercy and truth, viz. , on the part of God and of men, for the effort which proceeds from love and is directed to the showing forth of good is rewarded by this, that God and men are merciful to such and maintain truth to them, stand in truth to them; for חסד ואמת is to be understood here, as at Pro 3:3, neither of God nor of men exclusively, but of both together: the wicked who contrive evil lose themselves on the way to destruction, but grace and truth are the lot of those who aim at what is good, guarded and guided by which, they reach by a blessed way a glorious end.

Pro 14:23 There now follows a considerable series of proverbs (Pro 14:23-31) which, with a single exception (Pro 14:24), have all this in common, that one or two key-words in them begin with מ. 23 In all labour there is gain, But idle talk leadeth only to loss. Here the key-words are מותר and מחסור (parallel Pro 21:5, cf. with Pro 11:24), which begin with מ.

עצב is labour, and that earnest and unwearied, as at Pro 10:22. If one toils on honestly, then there always results from it something which stands forth above the endeavour as its result and product, vid . , at Job 30:11, where it is shown how יתר, from the primary meaning to be stretched out long, acquires the meaning of that which hangs over, shoots over, copiousness, and gain.

By the word of the lips, on the contrary, i. e. , purposeless and inoperative talk (דּבר שׂפתים as Isa 36:5, cf. Job 11:2), nothing is gained, but on the contrary there is only loss, for by it one only robs both himself and others of time, and wastes strength, which might have been turned to better purpose, to say nothing of the injury that is thereby done to his soul; perhaps also he morally injures, or at least discomposes and wearies others.

Pro 14:24 24 It is a crown to the wise when they are rich; But the folly of fools remains folly. From Pro 12:4, 31; Pro 17:6, we see that עטרת חכמים is the predicate. Thus it is the riches of the wise of which it is said that they are a crown or an ornament to them. More than this is said, if with Hitzig we read, after the lxx, ערמם, their prudence, instead of עשׁרם.

For then the meaning would be, that the wise need no other crown than that which they have in their prudence. But yet far more appropriately “riches” are called the crown of a wise man when they come to his wisdom; for it is truly thus that riches, when they are possessed along with wisdom, contribute not a little to heighten its influence and power, and not merely because they adorn in their appearance like a crown, or, as we say, surround as with a golden frame, but because they afford a variety of means and occasions for self-manifestation which are denied to the poor.

By this interpretation of 24a, 24b comes out also into the light, without our requiring to correct the first אוּלת, or to render it in an unusual sense. The lxx and Syr. translate the first אולת by διατριβή (by a circumlocution), the Targ. by gloria , fame - we know not how they reach this. Schultens in his Com. renders: crassa opulentia elumbium crassities , but in his Animadversiones he combines the first אולת with the Arab.

awwale, precedence, which Gesen. approves of. But although the meaning to be thick (properly coalescere ) appertains to the verbal stem אול as well as the meaning to be before (Arab. âl, âwila, wâl), yet the Hebr. אוּלת always and everywhere means only folly, from the fundamental idea crassities (thickness). Hitzig’s אוּלת (which denotes the consequence with which the fool invests himself) we do not accept, because this word is Hitzig’s own invention.

Rather לוית is to be expected: the crown with which fools adorn themselves is folly. But the sentence: the folly of fools is (and remains) folly (Symmachus, Jerome, Venet . , Luther), needs the emendation as little as Pro 16:22, for, interpreted in connection with 24a, it denotes that while wisdom is adorned and raised up by riches, folly on the other hand remains, even when connected with riches, always the same, without being either thereby veiled or removed - on the contrary, the fool, when he is rich, exhibits his follies always more and more.

C. B. Michaelis compares Lucian’s simia est simia etiamsi aurea gestet insignia .

Pro 14:25 25 A witness of truth delivereth souls; But he who breathes out lies is nothing but deception. When men, in consequence of false suspicions or of false accusations, fall into danger of their lives (דיני נפשׁות is the designation in the later language of the law of a criminal process), then a tongue which, pressed by conscientiousness and not deterred by cowardice, will utter the truth, saves them.

But a false tongue, which as such ( vid . , Pro 14:5) is a יפח כזבים (after the Masora at this place ויפח, defective ), i. e. , is one who breathes out lies ( vid . , regarding יפיח at Pro 6:19), is mere deception (lxx, without reading מרמּה [as Hitzig does]: δόλιος). In Pro 12:17 מרמה is to be interpreted as the object. accus. of יגיד carried forward, but here to carry forward מצּיל (Arama, Löwenstein) is impracticable - for to deliver deceit = the deceiver is not expressed in the Hebr.

- מרמה is, as possibly also Heb 12:16 (lxx δόλιος), without אישׁ or עד being supplied, the pred. of the substantival clause: such an one is deception (in bad Latin, dolositas ), for he who utters forth lies against better knowledge must have a malevolent, deceitful purpose.

Pro 14:26 26 In the fear of Jahve lies a strong ground of confidence, And the children of such an one have a refuge. The so-called בּ essentiae stands here, as at Psa 68:5; Psa 55:19; Isa 26:4, before the subject idea; the clause: in the fear of God exists, i. e. , it is and proves itself, as a strong ground of confidence, does not mean that the fear of God is something in which one can rely (Hitzig), but that it has (Pro 22:19; Jer 17:7, and here) an inheritance which is enduring, unwavering, and not disappointing in God, who is the object of fear; for it is not faith, nor anything else subjective, which is the rock that bears us, but this Rock is the object which faith lays hold of (cf.

Isa 28:16). Is now the וּלבניו to be referred, with Ewald and Zöckler, to 'ה? It is possible, as we have discussed at Gen 6:1. ; but in view of parallels such as Pro 20:7, it is not probable. He who fears God entails in the Abrahamic way (Gen 18:19) the fear of God on his children, and in this precious paternal inheritance they have a מחסה (not מחסה, and therefore to be written with Masoretic exactness מחסּה), a fortress or place of protection, a refuge in every time of need (cf.

Psa 71:5-7). Accordingly, ולבניו refers back to the 'ירא ה, to be understood from 'ביראת ה (lxx, Luther, and all the Jewish interpreters), which we find not so doubtful as to regard on this account the explanation after Psa 73:15, cf. Deu 14:1, as necessary, although we grant that such an introduction of the N. T. generalization and deepening of the idea of sonship is to be expected from the Chokma .

Pro 14:27 27 The fear of Jahve is a fountain of life, To escape the snares of death. There springs up a life which makes him who carries in himself (cf. Joh 4:14, ἐν αὐτῷ) this welling life, penetrating and strong of will to escape the snares (write after the Masora ממּקשׁי defective ) which death lays, and which bring to an end in death - a repetition of Pro 13:4 with changed subject.

Pro 14:28 28 In the multitude of the people lies the king’s honour; And when the population diminishes, it is the downfall of his glory. The honour or the ornament ( vid . , regarding הדר, tumere , ampliari , the root-word of הדר and הדרה at Isa 63:1) of a king consists in this, that he rules over a great people, and that they increase and prosper; on the other hand, it is the ruin of princely greatness when the people decline in number and in wealth.

Regarding מחתּה, vid . , at Pro 10:14. בּאפס signifies prepositionally “without” (properly, by non-existence), e. g. , Pro 26:20, or adverbially “groundless” (properly, for nothing), Isa 52:4; here it is to be understood after its contrast בּרב־: in the non-existence, but which is here equivalent to in the ruin (cf. אפס, the form of which in conjunction is אפס, Gen 47:15), lies the misfortune, decay, ruin of the princedom.

The lxx ἐν δὲ ἐκλείψει λαοῦ συντριβὴ δυνάστου. Certainly רזון (from רזן, Arab. razuna, to be powerful) is to be interpreted personally, whether it be after the form בּגוד with a fixed, or after the form יקושׁ with a changeable Kametz ; but it may also be an abstract like שׁלום (= Arab. selâm), and this we prefer, because in the personal signification רזן, Pro 8:15; Pro 31:4, is used.

We have not here to think of רזון (from רזה), consumption (the Venet . against Kimchi, πενίας); the choice of the word also is not determined by an intended amphibology (Hitzig), for this would be meaningless.

Pro 14:29 29 He that is slow to anger is rich in understanding; But he that is easily excited carries off folly. ארך אפּים (constr. of ארך) is he who puts off anger long, viz. , the outbreak of anger, האריך, Pro 19:11, i. e. , lets it not come in, but shuts it out long (μακρόθυμος = βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν, Jam 1:19); and קצר־רוּח, he who in his spirit and temper, viz.

, as regards anger (for רוּח denotes also the breathing out and snorting, Isa 25:4; Isa 33:11), is short, i. e. , (since shortness of time is meant) is rash and suddenly (cf. quick to anger, praeceps in iram , 17a) breaks out with it, not ὀλιγόψυχος (but here ὀξύθυμος), as the lxx translate 17a. The former, who knows how to control his affections, shows himself herein as “great in understanding” (cf.

2Sa 23:20), or as a “man of great understanding” (Lat. multus prudentiâ ); the contrary is he who suffers himself to be impelled by his affections into hasty, inconsiderate action, which is here expressed more actively by מרים אוּלת. Does this mean that he bears folly to the view (Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster, and others)? But for that idea the Mishle style has other expressions, Pro 12:23; Pro 13:16; Pro 15:2, cf.

Pro 14:17. Or does it mean that he makes folly high, i. e. , shows himself highly foolish (lxx, Syr. , Targum, Fleischer, and others)? But that would be expressed rather by הגדּיל or הרבּה. Or is it he heightens folly (Löwenstein, Hitzig)? But the remark that the angry ebullition is itself a gradual heightening of the foolish nature of such an one is not suitable, for the choleric man, who lets the evenness of his disposition be interrupted by a breaking forth of anger, is by no means also in himself a fool.

Rashi is right when he says, מפרישה לחלקו, i. e. , (to which also Fleischer gives the preference) aufert pro portione sua stultitiam . The only appropriate parallel according to which it is to be explained, is Pro 3:35. But not as Ewald: he lifts up folly, which lies as it were before his feet on his life’s path; but: he takes off folly, in the sense of Lev 6:8, i.

e. , he carries off folly, receives a portion of folly; for as to others, so also to himself, when he returns to calm blood, that which he did in his rage must appear as folly and madness.

Pro 14:30 30 A quiet heart is the life of the body, But covetousness is rottenness in the bones. Heart, soul, flesh, is the O. T. trichotomy, Psa 84:3; Psa 16:9; the heart is the innermost region of the life, where all the rays of the bodily and the soul-life concentrate, and whence they again unfold themselves. The state of the heart, i. e. , of the central, spiritual, soul-inwardness of the man, exerts therefore on all sides a constraining influence on the bodily life, in the relation to the heart the surrounding life.

Regarding לב מרפּא, vid . , at Pro 12:18. Thus is styled the quiet heart, which in its symmetrical harmony is like a calm and clear water-mirror, neither interrupted by the affections, nor broken through or secretly stirred by passion. By the close connection in which the corporeal life of man stands to the moral-religious determination of his intellectual and mediately his soul-life - this threefold life is as that of one personality, essentially one - the body has in such quiet of spirit the best means of preserving the life which furthers the well-being, and co-operates to the calming of all its disquietude; on the contrary, passion, whether it rage or move itself in stillness, is like the disease in the bones (Pro 12:4), which works onward till it breaks asunder the framework of the body, and with it the life of the body.

The plur. בּשׂרים occurs only here; Böttcher, §695, says that it denotes the whole body; but בּשׂר also does not denote the half, בשׂרים is the surrogate of an abstr . : the body, i. e. , the bodily life in the totality of its functions, and in the entire manifoldness of its relations. Ewald translates bodies, but בשׂר signifies not the body, but its material, the animated matter; rather cf.

the Arab. âbshâr, “corporeal, human nature,” but which (leaving out of view that this plur. belongs to a later period of the language) has the parallelism against it. Regarding קנאה (jealousy, zeal, envy, anger) Schultens is right: affectus inflammans aestuque indignationis fervidus , from קנא, Arab. ḳanâ, to be high red.

Pro 14:31 31 He who oppresseth the poor reproacheth his Maker; And whosoever is merciful to the poor, it is an honour to him. Line first is repeated in Pro 17:5 somewhat varied, and the relation of the idea in 31b is as Pro 19:17, according to which וּמכבּדו is the predicate and חונן אביון the subject (Symmachus, Targ. , Jerome, Venet . , Luther), not the reverse (Syr.)

; חונן is thus not the 3 per. Po . (lxx), but the part . Kal (for which 21b has the part. Po . מחונן). The predicates חרף עשׂהוּ ( vid . , regarding the perf. Gesen. §126, 3) and ומכבדו follow one another after the scheme of the Chiasmus . עשׁק has Munach on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and on the second the העמדה sign ( vid . , Torath Emeth , p.

21), as e. g. , פּוטר, Pro 17:14, and אהב, Pro 17:19. The showing of forbearance and kindness to the poor arising from a common relation to one Creator, and from respect towards a personality bearing the image of God, is a conception quite in the spirit of the Chokma , which, as in the Jahve religion it becomes the universal religion, so in the national law it becomes the human.

Thus also Job 31:15, cf. Pro 3:9 of the Epistle of James, which in many respects has its roots in the Book of Proverbs. Mat 25:40 is a New Testament side-piece to 31b.

Pro 14:32 This verse also contains a key-word beginning with מ, but pairs acrostically with the proverb following: When misfortune befalls him, the godless is overthrown; But the righteous remains hopeful in his death. When the subject is רעה connected with רשׁע (the godless), then it may be understood of evil thought and action (Ecc 7:15) as well as of the experience of evil ( e.

g. , Pro 13:21). The lxx (and also the Syr. , Targ. , Jerome, and Venet.) prefers the former, but for the sake of producing an exact parallelism changes במותו [in his death] into בתמּו [in his uprightness], reversing also the relation of the subject and the predicate: ὁ δὲ πεποιθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὁσιότητι (the Syr. : in this, that he has no sin; Targ. : when he dies) δίκαιος.

But no Scripture word commends in so contradictory a manner self-righteousness, for the verb חסה never denotes self-confidence, and with the exception of two passages (Jdg 9:15; Isa 30:2), where it is connected with בּצל, is everywhere the exclusive ( vid . , Psa 118:8.) designation of confidence resting itself in God, even without the 'בה, as here as at Psa 17:7.

The parallelism leads us to translate ברעתו, not on account of his wickedness, but with Luther, in conformity with במותו, in his misfortune, i. e. , if it befall him. Thus Jeremiah (Jer 23:12) says of the sins of his people: בּאפלה ידּחוּ, in the deep darkness they are driven on ( Niph . of דחח = דחה), and Pro 24:16 contains an exactly parallel thought: the godless stumble ברעה, into calamity.

Ewald incorrectly: in his calamity the wicked is overthrown - for what purpose then the pronoun? The verb דחה frequently means, without any addition, “to stumble over heaps,” e. g. , Psa 35:5; 36:13. The godless in his calamity is overthrown, or he fears in the evils which befall him the intimations of the final ruin; on the contrary, the righteous in his death, even in the midst of extremity, is comforted, viz.

, in God in whom he confides. Thus understood, Hitzig thinks that the proverb is not suitable for a time in which, as yet, men had not faith in immortality and in the resurrection. Yet though there was no such revelation then, still the pious in death put their confidence in Jahve, the God of life and of salvation - for in Jahve there was for ancient Israel the beginning, middle, and end of the work of salvation - and believing that they were going home to Him, committing their spirit into His hands (Psa 31:6), they fell asleep, though without any explicit knowledge, yet not without the hope of eternal life.

Job also knew that (Job 27:8.) between the death of those estranged from God and of those who feared God there was not only an external, but a deep essential distinction; and now the Chokma opens up a glimpse into the eternity heavenwards, Pro 15:24, and has formed, Pro 12:28, the expressive and distinctive word אל־מות, for immortality, which breaks like a ray from the morning sun through the night of the Sheol.

Pro 14:33 33 Wisdom rests in the heart of the man of understanding; But the heart of fools it maketh itself known. Most interpreters know not what to make of the second line here. The lxx (and after it the Syr.) , and as it appears, also Aquila and Theodotion, insert οὐ; the Targ. improves the Peshito, for it inserts אוּלת (so that Pro 12:23; Pro 13:16, and Pro 15:2 are related).

And Abulwalîd explains: in the heart of fools it is lost; Euchel: it reels about; but these are imaginary interpretations resting on a misunderstanding of the passages, in which ידע means to come to feel, and הודיע to give to feel (to punish, correct). Kimchi rightly adheres to the one ascertained meaning of the words, according to which the Venet . μέσον δὲ ἀφρόνων γνωσθήσεται.

So also the translation of Jerome: et indoctos quosque ( quoque ) erudiet , is formed, for he understands the “and is manifest among fools” (Luther) not merely, as C. B. Michaelis, after the saying: opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt , but of a becoming manifest, which is salutary to these. Certainly בּקרב can mean among = in the circle, of Pro 15:31; but if, as here and e.

g. , Jer 31:31, בקרב is interchanged with בלב, and if חכמה בקרב is the subject spoken of, as 1Ki 3:28, then בקרב does not mean among (in the midst of), but in the heart of the fool. According to this, the Talmud rightly, by comparison with the current proverb ( Mezîa 85b): אסתירא בלגינא קישׁ קישׁ קריא, a stater in a flaggon cries Kish, Kish , i. e. , makes much clatter.

In the heart of the understanding wisdom rests, i. e. , remains silent and still, for the understanding feels himself personally happy in its possession, endeavours always the more to deepen it, and lets it operate within; on the contrary, wisdom in the heart of fools makes itself manifest: they are not able to keep to themselves the wisdom which they imagine they possess, or the portion of wisdom which is in reality theirs; but they think, as it is said in Persius: Scire tuum nihil est nisi scire hoc te sciat alter .

They discredit and waste their little portion of wisdom (instead of thinking on its increase) by obtrusive ostentatious babbling.

Pro 14:34 Two proverbs follow regarding the state and its ruler: 34 Righteousness exalteth a nation, And sin is a disgrace to the people. The Hebr. language is richer in synonyms of “the people” than the German. גּוי (formed like the non-bibl. מוי, water, and נוי, corporealness, from גּוה, to extend itself from within outward; cf. Pro 9:3, גּפּי, Pro 10:13, גּו) is, according to the usus loq .

, like natio the people, as a mass swollen up from a common origin, and עם, 28a (from עמם, to bind), the people as a confederation held together by a common law; לאם (from לאם, to unite, bind together) is the mass (multitude) of the people, and is interchanged sometimes with גוי, Gen 25:23, and sometimes with עם, Pro 14:28. In this proverb, לאמּים stands indeed intentionally in the plur.

, but not גוי, with the plur. of which גּוים, the idea of the non-Israelitish nations, too easily connects itself. The proverb means all nations without distinction, even Israel (cf. under Isa 1:4) not excluded. History everywhere confirms the principle, that not the numerical, nor the warlike, nor the political, nor yet the intellectual and the so-called civilized greatness, is the true greatness of a nation, and determines the condition of its future as one of progress; but this is its true greatness, that in its private, public, and international life, צדקה, i.

e. , conduct directed by the will of God, according to the norm of moral rectitude, rules and prevails. Righteousness, good manners, and piety are the things which secure to a nation a place of honour, while, on the contrary, חטּאת, sin, viz. , prevailing, and more favoured and fostered than contended against in the consciousness of the moral problem of the state, is a disgrace to the people, i.

e. , it lowers them before God, and also before men who do not judge superficially or perversely, and also actually brings them down. רומם, to raise up, is to be understood after Isa 1:2, cf. Pro 23:4, and is to be punctuated תּרומם, with Munach of the penult . , and the העמדה-sign with the Tsere of the last syllable. Ben-Naphtali punctuates thus: תּרומם. In 34b all the artifices of interpretation (from Nachmani to Schultens) are to be rejected, which interpret חסד as the Venet .

(ἔλεος δὲ λαῶν ἁμαρτία) in its predominant Hebrew signification. It has here, as at Lev 20:17 (but not Job 6:14), the signification of the Syr. chesdho, opprobrium ; the Targ. חסדּא, or more frequently חסּוּדא, as among Jewish interpreters, is recognised by Chanan'el and Rashbam. That this חסד is not foreign to the Mishle style, is seen from the fact that חסּד, Pro 25:10, is used in the sense of the Syr.

chasedh. The synon. Syr. chasam, invidere, obtrectare , shows that these verbal stems are formed from the R. הס, stringere , to strike. Already it is in some measure perceived how חסד, Syr. chasadh, Arab. hasada, may acquire the meaning of violent love, and by the mediation of the jealousy which is connected with violent love, the signification of grudging, and thus of reproach and of envy; yet this is more manifest if one thinks of the root-signification stringere, in the meaning of loving, as referred to the subject, in the meanings of disgrace and envy, as from the subject directed to others.

Ewald (§51c) compares חסל and חסר, Ethiop. chasra, in the sense of carpere , and on the other side חסה in the sense of “to join;” but חסה does not mean to join ( vid . , Psa 2:12) and instead of carpere , the idea more closely connected with the root is that of stringere , cf. stringere folia ex arboribus (Caesar), and stringere (to diminish, to squander, strip) rem ingluvie (Horace, Sat .

i. 2. 8). The lxx has here read חסר (Pro 28:22), diminution, decay, instead of חסד (shame); the quid pro quo is not bad, the Syr. accepts it, and the miseros facit of Jerome, and Luther’s verderben (destruction) corresponds with this phrase better than with the common traditional reading which Symmachus rightly renders by ὄνειδος.

Pro 14:35 35 The king’s favour is towards a prudent servant, And his wrath visits the base. Regarding the contrasts משׂכּיל and מבישׁ, vid . , at Pro 10:5; cf. Pro 12:4. The substantival clause 35a may mean: the king’s favour has (possesses)... , as well as: it is imparted to, an intelligent servant; the arrangement of the words is more favourable to the latter rendering.

In 35b the gender of the verb is determined by attraction after the pred. , as is the case also at Gen 31:8; Job 15:31, Ewald, §317c. And “his wrath” is equivalent to is the object of it, cf. 22b, Pro 13:18. The syntactical character of the clause does not permit the supplying of ל from 35a. Luther’s translation proceeds only apparently from this erroneous supposition.

We take these verses together as forming a group which begins with a proverb regarding the good and evil which flows from the tongue, and closes with a proverb regarding the treasure in which blessing is found, and that in which no blessing is found.

Pro 15:1 1 A soft answer turneth away wrath, And a bitter word stirreth up anger. In the second line, the common word for anger (אף, from the breathing with the nostrils, Pro 14:17) is purposely placed, but in the first, that which denotes anger in the highest degree (חמה from יחם, cogn. חמם, Arab. hamiya, to glow, like שׁנה from ישׁן): a mild, gentle word turns away the heat of anger ( excandescentiam ), puts it back, cf.

Pro 25:15. The Dagesh in רּך follows the rule of the דחיק, i. e. , of the close connection of a word terminating with the accented eh, aah, ah with the following word ( Michlol 63b). The same is the meaning of the Latin proverb: Frangitur ira gravis Quando est responsio suavis . The דבר־עצב produces the contrary effect. This expression does not mean an angry word (Ewald), for עצב is not to be compared with the Arab.

ghaḍab, anger (Umbreit), but with Arab. 'aḍb, cutting, wounding, paining (Hitzig), so that דבר מעציב is meant in the sense of Psa 78:40 : a word which causes pain (lxx λυπηρός, Theod. πονικός), not after the meaning, a word provoking to anger (Gesenius), but certainly after its effect, for a wounding word “makes anger arise. ” As one says of anger שׁב, “it turns itself” ( e.

g. , Isa 9:11), so, on the other hand, עלה, “it rises up,” Ecc 10:4. The lxx has a third line, ὀργὴ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ φρονίμους, which the Syr. forms into a distich by the repetition of Pro 14:32, the untenableness of which is at once seen.

Pro 15:2 The πραΰ́της σοφίας (Jam 3:13) commended in Pro 15:1 is here continued: The tongue of the wise showeth great knowledge, And the mouth of fools poureth forth folly. As היטיב נגּן, Isa 23:16, means to strike the harp well, and היטיב לכת, Isa 30:29, to go along merrily, so היטיב דּעת, to know in a masterly manner, and here, where the subject is the tongue, which has only an instrumental reference to knowledge: to bring to light great knowledge (cf.

7a). In 2b the lxx translate στόμα δὲ ἀφρόνων ἀναγγέλλει κακά. From this Hitzig concludes that they read רעות as 28b, and prefers this phrase; but they also translated in Pro 13:16; Pro 14:28; Pro 26:11, אוּלת by κακίαν, for they interpreted the unintelligible word by combination with עולת, and in Pro 12:23 by ἀραῖς, for they thought they had before them אלות (from אלה).

Pro 15:3 3 The eyes of Jahve are in every place, Observing the evil and the good. The connection of the dual עינים with the plur. of the adjective, which does not admit of a dual, is like Pro 6:17, cf. 18. But the first line is a sentence by itself, to which the second line gives a closer determination, as showing how the eyes of God are everywhere (cf. 2Ch 16:9, after Zec 4:10) abroad over the whole earth, viz.

, beholding with penetrating look the evil and the good (צפה, to hold to, to observe, cf. ἐπιβλέποντες, Sir. 23:19), i. e. , examining men whether they are good or evil, and keeping them closely before His eyes, so that nothing escapes him. This universal inspection, this omniscience of God, has an alarming but also a comforting side. The proverb seeks first to warn, therefore it speaks first of the evil.

Pro 15:4 4 Gentleness of the tongue is a tree of life; But falseness in it is a wounding to the spirit. Regarding מרפּא, vid . , at Pro 12:18, and regarding סלף, at Pro 11:3; this latter word we derive with Fleischer from סלף, to subvert, overthrow, but not in the sense of “violence, asperitas , in as far as violent speech is like a stormy sea,” but of perversity, perversitas ( Venet .

λοξότης), as the contrast to truthfulness, rectitude, kindness. Gentleness characterizes the tongue when all that it says to a neighbour, whether it be instruction or correction, or warning or consolation, it says in a manner without rudeness, violence, or obtrusiveness, by which it finds the easiest and surest acceptance, because he feels the goodwill, the hearty sympathy, the humility of him who is conscious of his own imperfection.

Such gentleness is a tree of life, whose fruits preserve life, heal the sick, and raise up the bowed down. Accordingly, שׁבר בּרוּח is to be understood of the effect which goes forth from perversity or falseness of the tongue upon others. Fleischer translates: asperitas autem in ea animum vulnerat , and remarks, “שׁבר ברוח, abstr. pro concreto . The verb שׁבר, and the n.

verbale שׁבר derived from it, may, in order to render the meaning tropical, govern the prep. בּ, as the Arab. kaser baḳlby, he has broken my heart (opp. Arab. jabar baḳlaby), cf. בּפניו, Pro 21:29, vid . , De Glossis Habichtianis , p. 18; yet it also occurs with the accus. , Psa 69:21, and the corresponding gen. שׁבר רוּח, Isa 65:14. ” In any case, the breaking (deep wounding) is not meant in regard to his own spirit, but to that of the neighbour.

Rightly Luther: but a lying (tongue) makes heart-sorrow (elsewhere, a false one troubles the cheerful); Euchel: a false tongue is soul-wounding; and the translation of the year 1844: falsehood is a breach into the heart. Only for curiosity’s sake are two other interpretations of 4a and 4b mentioned: the means of safety to the tongue is the tree of life, i. e.

, The Torâ ( Erachin 15b); and: perversity suffers destruction by a breath of wind, after the proverb, כל שׁישׁ בו גסות רוח רוח קימעא שׁוברתו, a breath of wind breaks a man who is puffed up (which Meîri presents for choice, vid . , also Rashi, who understands רוח of the storm of judgment). The lxx translates, in 4b, a different text: ὁ δὲ συντηρῶν αὐτὴν πλησθήσεται πνεύματος; but the ישׂבּע רוּח here supposed cannot mean “to be full of spirit,” but rather “to eat full of wind.

” Otherwise the Syr. and Targ. : and he who eateth of his own fruit is satisfied (Heb. ואכל מפּריו ישׂבּע) - an attempt to give to the phrase ישׂבע a thought correct in point of language, but one against which we do not give up the Masoretic text.